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A NON-PARTISAN JUDICIARY*
By DEAN ROBERT L. STEARNS, Colorado University School
of Law, Denver, Colorado
discussion of the subject of judicial selection necessarily implies that the profession is not satisfied with
the present method of choosing our judiciary. It does
not necessarily carry the assumption, however, that all of the
defects of the administration of justice are to be blamed upon
the judges. There are unquestionably many such defects,
of some of which the public complains, of some of which the
bar complains, and of some of which the judges themselves
complain.
But the public, the bar, and the bench must
all share the respon~ibility.
Moreover, the general discussion of this subject does
not necessarily imply that there is general inefficiency among
the members of the bench. True there are some judges on
the bench who ought not to be there. But you know and
I know that most of the judges are well qualified for their
work, discharge it conscientiously, with the result which is
in the main satisfactory. But even the best of them are
seriously handicapped in the performance of their duties by
the system which we employ in their selection and maintenance.
A consideration of the problem, therefore, should carry
no odium or stigma, but indicates an awakening of the public
consciousness to a problem of general social concern, and we
all know that the agitation of thought is the beginning of
wisdom.
There are three great problems which the profession has
faced for generations and undoubtedly will continue to face
for many generations to come. The first relates to the
technicalities and inefficiencies of procedure. The second concerns the intellectual and moral standards and qualifications
for admission to the bar. The third concerns our subject
today of judicial personnel and methods of selection. These
problems of the social order are like problems of public health
-they are always with us and when we think we are making
progress in one line, a new disorder appears which we had
not anticipated.

ANY

*Address delivered October 9, 1936, at the annual meeting of the Missouri
Bar Association in Kansas City, Mo. Reprinted from Novrmber, 1936. issue of the
Missouri Bar Journal.
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The first of these ever-recurring problems to be faced
by the profession was the improvement of procedure. The
lawyers had become so wedded to the old inherited system
of common law pleading that it took generations of adjudication and legislation to produce the reform resulting
in our Codes of Practice and Procedure. However, salutary this reform may have been, it resulted in new problems and difficulties which are almost as fundamental and
serious as the original difficulty sought to be corrected. As
the result we have today a system of practice while undoubtedly an improvement over the original, is by no means
a satisfying system. One of the two major consequences of
this reform flows from the fact that because legislation has
been resorted to, the judicial initiative and energy has been
sapped and many judges even doubt the existence of their
inherent rule-making power and decline to correct patent
defects without first obtaining legislative sanction. I for
one feel very strongly that this situation is the root of much
of our present dilemma. Another consequence of this reform
of procedure again relates to the necessity for legislation, and
whereas New York and California, which first adopted the
Field Codes, have by the same legislative device so amended
the codes thus adopted that the original simplified procedure
is hardly recognizable.
In the second major problem-that of standards for admission to the bar-we have made and are making some
progress, but we have yet a long way to go. Most of the
states have adopted minimum standards for legal education
promulgated by the American Bar Association. More are
following each year, but we still have shysters and pettifoggers, and disbarments are not yet a thing of the past and
possibly will not be.
My point is that these are social problems and are dependent for their successful solution not upon a formula,
but on the human element of the eternal vigilance of an
idealistic and energetic group.
Such work is the nature of our problem of judicial selection and personnel. While we may work out a solution
that looks well on paper, it can only succeed if the lawyers
and the public generally are constantly aware of the fact
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that in selecting judges they are selecting human instrumentalities and they must regard not only the letter, but
the spirit embodied in any intelligent system of judicial selection. "The spirit giveth life."
No nation has an ideal system of selecting judges. We
are constantly cited to the example of England in matters
concerning the administration of justice. But in England
the selection is purely a political matter. In commenting
upon this phase of the subject before a conference such as
this, held by the lawyers of Ohio in 1934, Professor Edson
R. Sunderland of the law faculty of the University of
Michigan, stated as follows with reference to the English
Judiciary:
"All judges are selected by political party leaders and they are
selected among those who have rendered political services to the party.
The Prime Minister, the head of the party in power, selects the socalled titled judges-the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the
Master of the Rolls, and the President of the Admiralty, Divorce and
Probate Division. He selects the five Lord Justices of Appeal, and the
seven Law Lords of the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor, the
political appointee of the party, selects all the county judges and the
ordinary judges of the High Court. The Home Secretary, another
political appointee of the party, selects all the paid magistrates who try
the criminal cases throughout England."

Thus, says Professor Sunderland, the whole system is
a strictly political arrangement for political appointment
of those entitled to reward for political services. And yet,
the judges, when so appointed are very satisfactory. Why?
Well, they have their own special remedies and safeguards.
In the first place ability is obtained by the distinctive institution of the barrister class in England. The barrister
is a specialist in court procedure. He spends substantially
all his time in court. The leading barristers are consistently competing with one another before the public eye. The
lawyers know who the best men are; the judges know and
the public knows. It would be politically very unwise to
pass over these men in the matter of judicial selection and
choose men of inferior ability as everyone would be aware
of what was done. Hence even though politics is at the
root of the system, the judicial appointments are good.
But why do these men want the office? First, the salaries are adequate. As Mr. H. G. Wells has said they "pay
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them enough to make them individually incorruptible."
Second, the English Judge has a permanent tenure of office.
Once seated, he is there for life or during good behavior and
has no need of political maneuvering to maintain his office.
Third, there are practically no promotions from a lower to
a higher court. Promotions are so few that no English judge
ever counts on them. When he takes his position on the
bench, he takes it as a life career and has no need for political
jockeying for promotion. His only function, and function
enough it clearly is, is to discharge his duty and conduct his
court as befits the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon judiciary.
In France the situation is entirely different. There is
no politics in the original appointment of judges because the
Judicial Department of the Government is a civil service
which men enter in their youth as our young men enter the
bar. They choose the judiciary as against the bar as a life
career. Long preparation and severe tests are applied, and
when these men enter the judicial profession they enter it at
the bottom of the ladder. They are given small appointments
at first, and these offices gradually increase in importance
as the occupant is moved from one position to another during
his entire judicial career, but politics is the basis of the system
involved. If a French judge desires promotion, he must keep
in touch with those who have political power, with the
Minister of Justice at the head, for advancement depends not
only upon his ability, but upon his standing with those in
government authority who are politically selected.
I have mentioned these two situations in order that we
may have them in mind when we discuss the situation in
the United States today. Here we have no barrister class
and we have no judicial civil service. Our problems are
peculiar to ourselves, and we must answer them in our own
way. Ours is a democracy-admittedly one of the most
difficult forms of government to maintain-but in the light
of the spectacle of modern continental Europe, I for one
regard it as the hope of our civilization.
It is interesting to note that the elective system for
judges obtains in only one other country, namely: Switzerland. Moreover, it has not always been the system in this
country. The appointive system existed in all the original
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colonies in the first instance, with the exception of Georgia.
About 1830, however, a definite trend of sentiment for the
popular election of judges swept over the country,. Mississippi was the first of the appointive states to employ the
elective method, and thereafter practically all of the states
followed the elective plan.
Thirty-six states now elect their judges in some manner.
Thirty-two elect them by partisan ballots. These are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Michigan, Missouri,
Maryland, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.
Thirteen states now use some form of non-partisan ballot.
These are Arizona, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Wisconsin not
only uses a non-partisan ballot, but holds a separate election
for judges on the first Tuesday in April. New Jersey conforms closely to the federal system. The appointments are
nominated by the governor and confirmed by the state senate.
In Maine, Mississippi, and New Hampshire, the governor
appoints, but a council confirms the appointment. In Connecticut the legislature selects on the nomination of the
governor. Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and
Virginia, the legislature selects without nomination. In
Florida, justices of the supreme court are elected while circuit
judges are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the
senate. In Mississippi, the reverse is true, and the governor
nominates justices of the supreme court and the senate confirms, while judges of the circuit court are elected.
Thus we see in most of our states a system of popular
election at periodic intervals. We are today questioning the
desirability of this system because of the evils incident to
political preferment and the lack of efficiency which the
system imposes on the judges who must from time to time
go before the people and face a re-election
As a result of
this dissatisfaction, numbers of our states are experimenting
with different devices in the matter of the selection of judges.
One of our great strengths lies in the fact that we have fortyeight separate laboratories for social experimentation, and it
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is to the results of the experiments from these laboratories
that we must look for improvement in the solution of our
social and local governmental problems.
Accordingly it would seem desirable for us to examine
some of the systems which have been suggested by various
states in attempting to cope with the problem of judicial
selection.
Only yesterday the Judicial Council of the State of
Missouri in a report submitted to the Supreme Court of
this State made some very pertinent observations and submitted some recommendations striking at the evil of political
partisanship and competitive elections in the choosing of
judges.. I quote one or two paragraphs from this report as
it appeared in the press:
JUDICIARY RECOMMENDATION

Regarding the council's judiciary recommendation, the
report says:
"We are persuaded that more care and deliberation must
be given to the selection of judges.We feel that whatever success has attended the selection of judicial candidates by the
primary method has been in spite of the many and obvious
defects of that system and not because of its merits.
"We do not recommend a departure from choosing our
judges by election, but we do strongly favor the nomination of judges for the supreme court, courts of appeal and
circuit courts by conventions, composed of delegates from
the state at large, or the districts or circuits, as the case may
be, at which no other candidates shall be nominated for office,
no party platform adopted and no business of any character
transacted except the nomination of judicial candidates."
"In our judgment, the selection of candidates for judicial position by the prirxary method has not remedied the
evils of the convention system, but has produced new and
additional defects.
"The spectacle of a candidate for judicial office going
from place to place soliciting votes is humiliating. The
spectacle of a man old enough, experienced enough, wise
enough to be selected judge, being compelled to spend months,
at great expense, going from county to county soliciting votes
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in an effort to obtain a nomination to that office is to cheapen
and degrade the office. That neither the bar nor the public
is able to 'draft' a man of high attainments who might accept
the office, but is not willing to enter into a scramble to obtain
it, is enough to condemn the system.
BAN POLITICS IN SELECTING JUDGES

"Furthermore, we feel that the selection of judicial candidates should be divorced, as far as possible, from party
politics. Such nominations should not turn upon the partisan attitude of the candidate, but upon his fitness for judicial
office.

"The system of judicial conventions is not new in Missouri. It has been in existence before. We have, therefore, concluded, after most thoughtful and deliberate consideration, to recommend that all candidates for judicial
office, including circuit judges, judges of the courts of appeals
and judges of the supreme court, be nominated solely at party
conventions called and held for that purpose alone."
It is very interesting to note, however, that your judicial
council recommends in favor of retaining the elective system.
By virtue of their very nature and training lawyers are
fundamentally conservative and instinctively oppose any
modification of the existing order. You will recall that
Massachusetts from its earliest days has had the appointive
system of selecting judges who hold office for life or during
good behavior. In 1853 a convention was held in that state
at which a modification of the State Constitution was under
consideration. Many of the delegates favored a plan for
selecting judges by popular election and reducing their tenure.
In opposing that proposal in one of the most outstanding
addresses of his distinguished career, Mr. Rufus Choate said:
"Sir, in this inquiry what mode of judicial appointment,
and what tenure of judicial office, you will recommend to
the people, I think that there is but one safe or sensible mode
of proceeding, and, that is to ascertain what mode of appoint ment, and what length and condition of tenure, will be most
certain, in the long run, guiding ourselves by the lights of all
the experience and all the observation to which we can resort,
to bring and keep the best judge upon the bench. .

.

. the
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best judge for the ends of his great office. There is no other
test. That an election by the people, once a year, or an ap,pointment by the governor once a year, or once in five, or
seven, or ten years, will operate to give to an ambitious young
lawyer (I refer to no one in this body) a better chance to be
made a judge... as the wheel turns round... is no recommendation, and is nothing to the purpose. That this consideration
has changed, or framed, the constitutions to some of the States
whose example has been pressed on us, I have no doubt. Let
it have no weight here. We, at least, hold that offices, and
most of all the judicial office, are not made for incumbents or
candidates, but for the people; to establish justice; to guarantee security among them. Let us constitute the office in
reference to its ends.
"I go for that system, if I can find it or help find it,
which gives me the highest degree of assurance, taking man
as he is, at his strongest and at his weakest, and in the average
of the lot of humanity, that there shall be the best judge on,
every bench of justice in the commonwealth, through its
successive generations. That we may safely adopt such a
system; that is to say, that we may do so and yet not abridge
or impair or endanger our popular polity in the least particular; that we may secure the best possible judge, and yet
retain, aye, help to perpetuate and keep in health, the utmost
affluence of liberty with which civil life can be maintained,
I will attempt to show hereafter. For the present, I ask, how
shall we get and keep the best judge for the work of the
judge?"
Mr. Choate then proceeded to consider one by one thie
arguments submitted by the proponents of the elective method
and demonstrated, obviously to the satisfaction of the convention, that the appointive system should be retained.
I mention this incident because when we consider any
modification of the existing system we must not do so lightly
or inadvisedly but soberly, advisedly and in the light of experience and wise counsel. I commend Mr. Choate's entire
address to any group of lawyers grappling with this problem.
But let us also look at the contemporary scene. Other
states in our national union are facing and solving this
problem. What steps are they taking?
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In the Journal of the American Bar Association for last
February Mr. Paul H. Sanders, Assistant to the Director to
the National Bar Program gives a very clear analysis of the
current proposals in the matter of the choice of judges.
The first revolt in the present movement against an
elected judiciary occurred in California, where the rapidly
growing population and the increase in the amount of litigation resulted in a critical congestion of the processes of
judicial administration.
In 1932 this condition brought
about an increase in the number of the judges of the general
trial court in the City of Los Angeles alone to fifty. In
order for these judges to retain their positions, it became necessary for them to devote from twenty-five per cent to forty per
cent of their time to political activities such as meetings,
speeches, radio addresses, etc. Public dissatisfaction with the
handling of judicial business was widespread. As a result oif
this dissatisfaction, a former judge of the Supreme Court,
John Perry Wood, assumed the burden of starting a movement for a change. This movement gained support and was
allied with other similar movements of dissatisfied individuals
and organizations. Without discussing the details of how the
change was brought about, suffice it to say that as a result of
this agitation, a measure was drafted and by a petition was
placed on the ballot for the adoption of a constitutional amendment, which amendment in outline form is as follows:
"(1)

An immediate change is made as to supreme and appellate

judges. Hereafter, when a vacancy occurs in those courts the governor
appoints a successor, subject to confirmation by a commission on qualification, consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a justice
of the District Court of Appeals, and the Attorney General. The justice thus appointed holds until the next biennial general election when
his name goes on the ballot with the question 'Shall Judge Blank be
elected to the office?' If elected, he holds for the regular terms, after
which his name comes up again in like manner. If not elected, the
governor fills the resulting vacancy in the same way. The only way to
get on the bench is by the governor's appointment.
(2) As to the judges of the general trial court, no immediate
change is made, but the people in each county may, by a majority vote,
adopt the new system provided for appellate judges, as the mode of
selection of trial judges in that county."

To me the most interesting phase of this plan is the feature which requires the appointed judge at the next election to
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run without competition except as against his own judicial
record.
A recent act of signal importance has occurred in the state
of Ohio. The bar association of that state at its annual meeting in 19 3 5 approved a plan which provides that in case of the
vacancy in the Supreme Court, a judicial council, consisting
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the Court
of Appeals, a judge of the Common Pleas Court, a municipal
judge, a probate judge and three practicing lawyers be appointed by the governor and shall submit to the governor a
roster consisting of not less than three nor more than five
names; that the governor shall make appointment from the
list thus furnished and that the appointment shall be confirmed by the senate. At the end of the term fixed by law the
record of the judge is submitted for approval or disapproval,
similar to the plan originating in Georgia. It is interesting to
note that the Ohio Bar Association voted its approval of this
suggestion by a majority of 209 to 72.
The plan proposed by the Dade County Florida Bar
Association involves the selection of judges other than Supreme Court judges by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
which is to be followed by a confirmation by the other justices
of the Supreme Court. It is clear, however, that such a plan,
in order to guard against a very patent danger, should provide
that the appointive officer is himself to be elected and thus made
responsible to the will of the people. As I take it, the essential
quality of a democracy is to keep the selection of our public
officers out of the control of any single individual or continuous group, thus enabling us constantly to draw our personnel from the reservoir of material which is constantly
coming to the front as a result of the continuous process of
individual competition and individual development. The
great danger of our system lies in the circumstances which
requires a candidate who is willing to devote himself to the
public service, to seek his own re-election by competing with
men oftentimes inferior in ability but more resourceful in the
business of gaining popular support.
This subject has engaged the attention of the lawyers of
the state of New Mexico for the past two years. At its meeting in 1935, the subject was presented in an illuminating
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address by Judge C., M. Botts. His address so challenged the
attention of the association that prompt action was evoked.
A resolution was adopted empowering the president to appoint a committee to be charged with the duty of giving a
further study to the problem; That committee reported to
the association at its meeting in 1936 and presented to the
association a complete summary of plans which have heretofore been employed in other states, as well as those which are
now under consideration in many more, and outlined a program for the coming year whereby the best of the suggested
devices be subject to further scrutiny and discussion, not only
by the lawyers, but by other organized groups throughout the
state. One of the interesting suggestions considered by the
lawyers of New Mexico provided for the creation of a judicial
council to consist of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the
attorney general, the president of the state bar association, and
four outstanding laymen from different parts of the state to
be selected by these three. In case of a vacancy in the office of
the justice of the Supreme Court, the council thus created shall
submit a list of five names to the governor from which he shall
make an appointment, the appointment shall then be submitted to the members of the bar association for a vote by
secret ballot on approval or disapproval. If the appointment
is disapproved, the governor shall make another selection from
the list. In the case of a vacancy in the office of district judge,
the council shall submit a list of three names to the governor
from which an appointment shall be made, and this proposal
shall be subjected to the same referendum vote of the members
of the bar association. The committee realized, however, that
such a proposal would necessitate a constitutional amendment,
and accordingly suggested certain interim improvements in the
business of selecting judges which could be made by a statutory
amendment to the end that the selection of judges could be
made with less consideration of party affiliation. The committee concluded its report with the statement that further
study was needed but quite obviously felt that progress had
been made in letting the lawyers and the people realize that
there is nothing sacrosanct about the present system and that
if it has outlived its period of usefulness, it might well now
be amended.
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Thus there is definitely observable throughout the country today a ferment of thought concerning judicial selection.
Each state must solve its own problem, but is doing so wisely
by considering the suggestions made and plans adopted by
various other states which have already taken the lead.
But whether we consider the California, the Ohio, the
Florida, or any of the other plans, certain principles appear
constant in all of them and properly so, because one of the
great strengths of any democratic government lies in the purity
of its courts and the integrity and independence of the judges
selected to sit on them. It seems desirable to remove our judges
from the necessity of political competition, a necessity which
is itself repugnant to our most qualified men, and at the same
time a cause of serious interference with the uninterrupted
performance of their judicial duties. But on the other hand,
this selection must not be so far removed from the will of the
people that we destroy that ever-present responsibility for the
administration of public office, which is the ideal of democracy.
The perfect system has not yet been evolved by any
means. The last word has not yet been said. A plan which
might work satisfactorily in one community might by reason
of local consideration be a total failure in another. The
administration of justice is a science and an art which can only
be attained by human instrumentalities, and whatever system
is employed must depend for its efficacy upon two great human
qualifications; first, the caliber of the men selected, and second,
the support and consent of an enlightened public opinion. In
the last analysis we are dealing with men, and we are dependent on them, as well as on the system which we employ for the
adequate administration of justice.
The qualities which the British poet, Sir William Jones,
himself a famous law writer, ascribed to the state over one
hundred years ago, are equally applicable today, to that great
instrument of the state, the system of the administration of
justice. You will recall his lines:
"What constitutes a state?
Not high-raised battlements nor labored mound,
Thick walls nor moated gate,
Nor cities proud with spires and turrets crowned
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Nor starred and spangled courts,
Where low-born baseness wafts perfume to pride.
But men, high-minded men,
Men who their duties know,
But know also their rights,
And knowing, dare maintain them."

MEETING OF HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

By G.

DEXTER BLOUNT, of the Denver Bar

NEW constitution was adopted by the American Bar
Association at its annual meeting in Boston in August,
1936. The principal object was to make the Association more truly representative of the practicing lawyers in
this country. As one of the means of accomplishing that
result the new constitution provides for the creation of a
House of Delegates and invests the House of Delegates with.
exclusive authority (subject only to referendum to the membership on certain questions) to formulate the policies and to
control and direct the administration of the affairs of the
Association.
The House of Delegates is composed in part of a State
Delegate from each state representing the members of the Association in that state, a State Bar Association Delegate representing the principal State Bar Association in each state, a
delegate from each of certain large local Associations, the
Board of Governors, consisting of one Governor from each of
the ten United States Judicial Circuits, the President and
Treasurer of the Association, the Editor of its Journal and a
delegate from each of certain similar organizations such as
American Law Institute and American Judicature Society.
Altogether, the delegates directly represent a total of about
90,000 of the 175,000 lawyers in the United States.
The first meeting of the House of Delegates (except a
preliminary organization meeting held at Boston immediately
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after it was created) was held in Columbus, Ohio, January 5,
6 and 7, 1937. It was probably the most representative
meeting of lawyers that has ever convened in the'United States
of America. Accredited delegates from every state except
Idaho, representing their respective groups and numbering
about 165, were present. The sessions, which began Tuesday
afternoon and continued morning, afternoon and evening
through Thursday, were attended enthusiastically and conscientiously by the delegates. During the sessions the delegates adopted rules of procedure for the House of Delegates,
and listened to the delivery of well prepared addresses, and
also debates and discussions, on such pertinent subjects as the
growth of bureaucracy in government, the adoption of a
Federal Administrative Court to take over the judicial and
semi-judicial functions of numerous federal commissions,
special courts, bureaus and administrative boards, the adoption
by states of improved methods for the selection of judges, and
the development of means of solving the problems, economic
and otherwise, that have arisen by reason of the increasing
number of lawyers per capita of the population. They also
considered at length a proposal to issue to the members a periodical service letter carrying notes on important decisions,
comments on pending legislation and other subjects of interest
to lawyers. Lack of necessary 'funds to finance the service
letter at this time caused postponement of its adoption.
This meeting was of substantial importance. Points of
view of lawyers from all sections of the country were expressed
frankly and vigorously by their delegates. Each of the delegates has necessarily taken hdme with him a better realization
of the structure and objectives of the Association and the
extensive and effective work that the Association is doing on
a broad front to improve conditions in the practice of law and
to aid in the advancement of the well-being of the American
people. The impressions gained by the delegates will necessarily be disseminated, at least to some extent, among the
lawyers they represent.
The delegates from Colorado were Mr. L. Ward Bannister, who represented the Colorado Bar Association, and the
writer, who, as State Delegate from Colorado, represented
the members of American Bar Association in this state.

ATTORNEYS ADMITTANCE TO PRACTICE
IN CALIFORNIA
By JAMES D. FISHER, of the Colorado and CaliforniaBars

RIOR to the good old law, State Bar Act, and year of
193 1, it was a downright simple matter for an attorney from another state to be admitted to the practice
of law in California. Being a lawyer in good standing and
having practiced the preceding three years, all he had to do
was to have some attorney in this state approvingly propose
him and, hocus-pocus, he became native.
Previously, and shall we again say simply, he had of
course uprooted himself from the security, if any, of his
practice, if any, at his domicile and journeyed here to the
land of milk and honey, to become another pebble on the vast
legal profession sands of this fair state.
California advertises the fact that she is well supplied
with manpower in all lines of human endeavor. That she
has had, in particular, a surplusage in the legal profession is
common knowledge the country over. Despite exceedingly
searching examinations, she has not had a need for all of those
of her own inhabitants who were passing them and entering
practice. Naturally, therefore, the continuous influx of many,
bow-yourself-in, out-of-state attorneys, became a matter of
annoyance, if not of irritation. All in all, the ultimate outlook seemed to be: an attorney for every citizen.
An amendment to the State Bar Act, which seeks inter
alia, to raise the pre-legal requirement to two years of college work, will be presented to the next legislature. However, we are here concerned with the admittance of out-of-thestate attorneys.
Since said law of 193 1, which made admission of out-ofstate attorneys a strictly statutory proceeding under rules of
the Committee of Bar Examiners, the relative number of said
attorneys admitted annually, to those previously admitted
each year on motion, has been about one to seven or to eight.
The following brief delineation will enlighten as to the decline
in the influx and give anyone contemplating removal here a
sketchy idea of the procedure.
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An attorney applicant must now personally register
here his intention of applying for admittance at least three
months before filing his application. In order to so register
he must be a bona fide resident of this state.
He must have, in a local attorney, a sponsor who fills
out and signs a Sponsor's Certificate. To it must be attached
a Sponsor's Letter to the effect that the would-be applicant
has truly become a resident and why, and details his personal
knowledge of him and his qualifications for admittance. The
registration fee of $100.00 must accompany the application
to register, no part of which is refunded regardless of his fate
at any juncture in the proceeding. It covers, inter alia, the
expense of checking up, on the applicant; his answers in a
questionnaire form; and on other documents hereafter mentioned.
The required form, which he must fill out and file in
duplicate, is a voluminous questionnaire form, executed under
oathwhich picks him up at the moment of birth and requires
him to tell of just about his every movement from then until
now.
So far as he and the committee are concerned, he is then
all through for a while--except that he must obtain and file,
within the time for the filing of his application, the following
documents:
Certificate of the Supreme Court of the state of his late departure
of admission to practice and of good standing, signed by a justice of said
court. The writer filed one signed by A. H. While, clerk, which was
rejected.
Letters from every community in each state in which he has practiced, showmlg the writer's knowledge of the length of time of applicant's practice, his standing at the bar and in the community, and other
matters bearing on his fitness to practice law in California. Such letters
are to be presented from:
Two attorneys in good standing; two clients; two judges, who
should state the extent of his practice before them, etc.; the bar association.

Letter from an officer of his bank or banks regarding the satisfactoriness of his relations with the bank.
Printed instruction forms to send to the writers of said letters are
furnished.
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After investigation of the applicant is completed, he is
notified to appear, at a time stated, before the committee for a
personal examination. It is an individual examination under
oath, before the members of the committee, who have all of
the data concerning the applicant before them, and two stenographers to take down the questions and answers. And then he
is all through-until he receives a letter from the committee
advising that it has passed a resolution permitting or denying
him the right to take the next examination. If he is so permitted he is directed to file his application for admittance.
Having filed it he is all through-until the examination.
The Committee of Bar Examiners and the State Bar
Secretaries are courteous and helpful whenever possible. Nevertheless, by this time the applicant is impressed with the
seriousness of it all and develops a case of frightitis about the
examination.
The written examinations are fairly difficult, but not too
difficult, e.g.-the writer passed. However, there is an abundance of what may be termed "California law" and it is wise
to prepare diligently.
Papers of out-of-the-state attorneys are first marked and
after several weeks such applicants are advised of their fate.
They are also advised they may take the oath before the Supreme Court either at San Francisco or Sacramento on certain
dates, or await the naext sitting of that court in Los Angeles.
If by this time applicant has any money left he makes
the trip "up north." He is eager to be-all through-with
the business of being admitted.
Is the legal field here discouragingly overcrowded? Certainly it is, but this article is not intended to be a bromidical
warning of that fact or of the difficulty of admittance. Sometimes change means progress. The attorneys who come here
and are admitted are Americans on a new frontier. They fight
like challengers. Some of them soon do exceedingly well
and many have surpassed the mob in a rut. Unquestionably,
here is a state endowed by the Almighty with virtually every
requisite for fine human endeavor and existence and, after atl,
is not an excess of lawyers, an out of balance, common to all
states?

STATES' RIGHTS, NATIONALISM, AND THE
SUPREME COURT
By GEORGE R. FARNUM, of the Boston Bar, FormerAssistant
Attorney General of the United States, Before the Twentieth
Century Association, Boston, Mass., October 24, 1936
The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice.
-Alexander Hamilton.
But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez-faire. It is
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
-- Justice Holmes.

N 1835, with the passing of Marshall, the great formative
era in the history of American constitutional law was
brought to an end. The philosophy of the founding
fathers, of whom Marshall was a contemporary and whose
traditions he shared, had been vindicated, the solidarity of the
Union firmly established, and the power and importance of
the Supreme Court impressively demonstrated. Whether one
can fully accept all the unstinted superlatives that his memory
has evoked or whether one feels at times the moderating doubt
once expressed by Holmes, "'Whether, after Hamilton and
the Constitution itself, Marshall's work proved more than a
strong intellect, a good style, personal ascendency in his court,
courage, justice, and the convictions of his party," no one can
deny his further assertion that, "Time has been on Marshall's
side, and the theory for which Hamilton argued, and he decided, and Webster spoke and Grant fought, and Lincoln died,
is now our cornerstone."
The country viewed with mixed emotions the appointment by Jackson of his one-time attorney general and unconfirmed appointee to the treasury portfolio, Roger B. Taney as
head of the court. Of curious pathos was the lament of Justice Story, who for more than two decades had been the lFidus
Achates of his departed chief, "I am the l.,st of the old race of
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judges. I stand their solitary representative with a pained
heart and subdued confidence." In this chastening role he was
destined to be cast for another decade to come, representing
the old order in the helpless position of dissent. Yet, when he
died, of him Taney wrote, "What a loss the court has sustained in the death of Judge Story! It is irreparable, utterly
irreparable in this generation; for there is nobody equal to
him."
In the ever-recurring cycles that appear to govern human
thought and control human destiny, it seems in retrospect that
the hour had perhaps come for some political reorientationfor some shift in constitutional emphasis, at least for the time
being. Taney found already on the court two Jackson appointees and with the next two years two more were added of
Democratic persuasion. The change in judicial outlook,
while not revolutionary, was nevertheless clearly discernible
from the first term after Taney's accession in the dramatic
battle of the bridges, the faith of the new dispensation was
proclaimed, though in point of fact the issue turned on the
narrow question as to whether in a legislative grant of the
privilege of maintaining a toll bridge over the historic waters
of the Charles river between Boston and Charlestown, the
grant should be construed as exclusive by implication. In
denying a monopolistic privilege in the absence of an express
declaration, the chief justice, speaking for the court, declared
that "A state ought never to be presumed to surrender this
power [to promote the general welfare through improved
channels of communication] because, like the taxing power,
the whole community have an interest in preserving it undiminished," adding, in words of portentous implication,
"While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded,
we must not forget that the community also have rights, and
that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depend on
their faithful preservation." Standing, as he asserted, "Upon
the old law," and defending the spirit of adjudication of earlier
times, Story vigorously dissented and asserted that, after the
first argument six years before, Marshall had been minded to
sustain the exclusiveness of the grant. Writing afterwards,
he lugubriously asserted that "There will not, I fear, ever
in our day, be any case in which a law of a state or of Congress will be declared unconstitutional, for the old constitu-
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tional doctrines are fast fading away, and a change has come
over the public mind from which I augur little good."
Taney died in 1864 and with him passed another accentuated epoch in constitutional history. "The central conception of the court affecting constitutional interpretation,"
during his leadership, as recently put by an acute student, Professor Corwin, "was that of the federal equilibrium; in other
words, the idea that the then-existing distribution of powers
between the states and the national government should be
regarded as something essentially fixed and unchangeable."
Unlike Marshall, who at least by implication denied its relevancy in deciding questions of federal power, for Taney the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was a significant
limitation upon it. In the end, the tendency to. stunt the development of national jurisdiction to meet the exigencies of
"an indefinite and expanding future," came into violent impact'with the agitation over slavery-an institution that could
only be adequately dealt with by national action-and the
Civil War which exacted for the very preservation of the
q4nion the exercise of the fullest measure of national power.
A new cycle had set in, and unlike Marshall, his was the fateescaped by Marshall-to live to see his influence wane and his
control of the court largely disappear. Had the minority
opinion of the court in the Prize cases, in which he concurred,
prevailed, the government would have found itself in a most
awkward situation in effectively maintaining the blockade
and at the same time preventing foreign recognition of the
Confederacy. Had the opportunity presented itself, on evidence of his own writings, he would have created a staggering
handicap to the successful prosecution of the war by declaring the Conscription Act unconstitutional. What his views
would have been on the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation had he been afforded a chance to express them judicially
can only be surmised, but there was undoubted uneasiness on
this score at the time. A certain fatality presided over the
destinies of his reputation for many years-darkened to a
large measure by the persisting odium of the Dred Scott decision and the recollection of his frequent collisions with military authorities during the rebellion. Charles Francis Adams,
no stranger to the harassing problems of the war, greeted the
news of his passing with the exclamation of relief, "So old
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Taney is at last dead," and Charles Sumner declared that,
"The name of Taney is to be hooted down the pages of his:tory. Judgment is beginning now; and an emancipated country will fasten upon him the stigma which he deserves.
He administered justice at last wickedly and degraded the
judiciary of the country and degraded the age."
Now that the passions of his day have spent their fury,
and his work can be appraised and his motives judged in sober
retrospect, the world concedes his memory a very fair measure
of justice. In fact, with a large body of public opinion at the
present time, his adherence to a static conception of the Constitution and his sponsorship of states' rights, have given his
accomplishments a peculiar contemporary interest.
Charles Francis Adams, predicting that the choice of
Taney's successor would fall to Salmon P. Chase, former
secretary of the treasury in the Lincoln cabinet, opined that,
if it did, "He will have a great future before him in the molding of our new constitutional law." Adams proved an accurate prophet, though Lincoln made the selection with some
misgivings about Chase's well-known political restlessness.
During the nine years allotted to the new chief justice, the
court was largely occupied with war litigation and with the
harassing troubles of reconstruction. The course of adjudication marked a strong running of the tide toward extreme
nationalism, dictated by the necessity of giving the government a strong and free hand in liquidating post-war problems
and made possible by the ascendency of the Lincoln appointees,
of which Chase was the fifth. In the middle of the period,
however, in the celebrated Milligan case, the court vindicated
the great democratic principle that since "The Constitution
of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, at all times, and under all circumstances,"
it follows that its prescriptions could not "be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government" and that "Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in thg
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." It
should be furthermore noted in passing that the closing of the
period marked a perceptible ebbing of the tide from the high
water mark of nationalistic adjudication.
In 1874 President Grant selected Morrison R. Waite to
fill the vacancy caused by the death of Chase-an appointment

102

DICTA

which, according to Charles Warren, "was greeted with a
sense of relief but with no enthusiasm." During the fourteen
years of Waite's services, however, he conducted himself, in
the words of some competent critic, "to the satisfaction of the
bar and of the public."
The constitutional history of these
years, as well in fact of the entire period since the close of the
reconstruction
is largely what has been summarized as
"the history of era,
the adaptation of constitutional principles to
rapidly changing economic and social conditions." The fourteen years of Waite's incumbency may be roughly divided into
two periods, during the first of which, for the most part, the
recessive tendency noted at the close of his predecessor's service continued, with the court showing a pronounced disposition to maintain state authority. During the latter part of
his term, however, another change in tendency set in, with a
swing back toward a more nationalistic outlook, one which
was destined to increase for some time to come. Among thg
reasons that may have contributed to the change, two may be
singled out for mention. New appointments to the court had
affected the balance of opinion. Additionally, the transformation in American life due to the momentum of the Industrial Revolution and the impetus added to the exploitation
of the seemingly limitless natural resources of the country consequent on the release of the national energies previously absorbed in war and the political problems of its immediate
aftermath were making themselves felt. The growing sense
of national unity demanded a greater concentration of power
in the federal government, necessarily at the expense of state
sovereignty.
In 1888 Waite died and was succeeded by Melville
Weston Fuller, whose service extended to 1910. He was
in turn replaced by Edward Douglass White, who presided
until 1921. Contemporary fundamental conditions that
reacted on the spirit and character of the work of the court can
only be briefly summarized. Added to the phenomenal development of its continental affairs, the nation vastly extended
its international interests, assuming in this connection the
grave responsibilities of an imperialistic role. Together with
the strenuous and sustained efforts to deal both nationally and
locally with baffling economic and social problems, there was
imposed upon the court a large and burdensome program for
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Interstate commerce regulation,
constructive adjudication.
anti-trust legislation, and federal injunctions were to play an
important part in the decisions. To such an extent was the
growing power of the national government fostered that at the
very end of the period the late James M. Beck noted that,
"The insistence upon the reserved rights of the states has
become little more than a political platitude," adding, "The
American people think nationally and not locally, as they once
Midway in the
thought locally and rarely nationally."
period, however, the court itself put the situation with greater
restraint. "Our dual form of government has its perplexities
.. but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and
the powers reserved in the states and those conferred on the
nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral." The court, responsive to the exigencies of change,
had ushered in an era that would have assuaged the despair of
Story, expressed a century before, though just before its close
a divided court in the child labor case, served notice that constitutional barriers still stood against the growing pressure of
nationalism.
The terms of the court presided over by William Howard
Taft-who was appointed in 1921-marked no pronounced
change in fundamental attitude. At its beginning the second
child labor law, again by a divided court, was consigned to the
same fate as its predecessor. The judges were called upon to
deal with perplexing questions growing out of the prohibition
amendment and the Volstead Act. These decisions were
marked by two strong tendencies, first to uphold the arm of
the government in the widest fashion in what was to prove
a futile and sorry effort to deal with the liquor question by
national authority, and secondly to protect the constitutional
guarantees of individual rights and immunities from the
action of enforcement personnel. Throughout the period and
into that of the present chief justice, Charles Evans Hughes,
who succeeded Taft in 1930, the court continued on the whole
to adapt its views to the advancing spirit of nationalism and
the receding prestige of state authority.
With the advent of the New Deal and the efforts to deal
with the economic breakdown and its tragic consequences to
the welfare and morale of the country, through congressional
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legislation, these old issues of states' rights and national power
have again become major political issues, complicated by
alignment of curious interest from an historical point of view.
During the brief years since Roosevelt took office, the court
has been repeatedly called upon to pass on questions of the
greatest complexity and to adapt the Constitution to emergency conditions without impairing its essential integrity.
Never before-in so short a period-have so many laws passed
by Congress fallen before judicial scrutiny. For the most part
the court has been sharply divided, and rarely have dissenting
views been more vigorously expressed. The repercussion on
a public-unusually susceptible by reason of unprecedented
conditions and agitated by bitter partisan feelings and debate
-has been great. The result has been to push the court into
the center of the spotlight and to subject its work to the widest
public discussions, and the political campaign has in no wise
mitigated this situation.
No such compressed treatment of the history of the court
and the vicissitudes of constitutional adjudication as is here
ventured can present more than a very rough and sketchy
approximation to high lights and major trends. Minor divagation must be completely ignored. It will be seen, however,
that the work of interpreting constitutional prescriptions,
adapting them to the rapid changes in the fundamentals of
American life, and adjusting the ever-competing claims of state
authority and national power, has been constantly and profoundly influenced by the dominant conceptions of economic
policy, political philosophy, and social outlook of the times
and of the individuals composing a continuously changing
judicial personnel. Years ago, Lord Justice Mellish hazarded
the opinion that "the whole of the Rules of Equity and ninetenths of the Rules of the Common Law have in fact been
made by judges," though the scope of such legislation has
been largely disguised by the slowness of the process of judicial accretion through trial and error-the laborious process
"in pricking out a line in successive cases" as Chief Justice Taft
once called it-and by resort to the convention that the judges
only expound and apply the law as they actually find it. No
court, in no field, however, has played a more decisive legislative role than that of the United States Supreme Court in
constitutional decision. From this dilemma there is no pos-
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sible escape under the American system, and in the course of
the years the decisions of the court have necessarily reflected the
influence of those vast changes that years have wrought in the
character of American civilization. It has also reflected the
influence of the impact of society with alternating war and
peace, with the recurrent cycles of prosperity and depression
and with the vagaries of public opinion. On the whole, it can
be asserted that, viewed over the years, the movement of adjudication in the court has been one of cautious and at times
painful advance--checked intermittently by recoil and recession-but on the whole a normal reaction of an institution
recruited from members of a profession which, as De Tocqueville long ago observed, "are conservative as a class" and designed to function in harmony with the spirit of what has
been styled "the strange conservatism of a progressive people."
Not infrequently the court has been sharply divided as
divergent political, economic, and social views battled for
mastery, and there have seldom been long periods in which
some pronouncement of the court has not called forth choruses
of sharp public dissent and hostile criticism. Thus it must
ever be. Society is not static and the judicial process involved
in constitutional construction is implicated in its most creative
and dynamic role. In its fundamental aspects such criticism
is not to be entirely deprecated. There is no surer sign of the
fatal decay of thought that Emerson diagnosed than apathy
on the part of the people to the functioning of their major
political institutions. In fact, not infrequently dissenting
members of the court itself have expressed serious misgivings
as to the character and effect of particular decisions--such as
were voiced so long ago by Story. Time, however, has largely
deflated these misgivings as it has always tempered public opinion. In the end, sensible students of American government
have been persuaded that, on the whole, the court has amply
fulfilled the hope of those who established it as a basic factor
in American democracy, and has earned the respect and confidence of those who continue to look to it to perform the difficult task of preserving, on the one hand, the essential elements
of the Constitution while avoiding, on the other, any undue
frustration of the orderly evolution of human affairs toward a
better and happier social goal with the passing years and growing public enlightenment.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-SEPARATION AGREEMENT-MONTHLY SUPPORT TO WIFE-EFFECT OF DEATH OF HUSBAND-In the Matter of the Estate of Charles Russell Wise et al. vs. Wise et al.-No.
13932-Decided January 11, 1937-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Wise and his wife separated and entered into a separation agreement whereby the wife, in addition to receiving certain property, was to
receive monthly payments for her support during her lifetime and
whereby she waived all claims against thehusband's estate as his wife or
heir and the husband unconditionally waived all his rights to her estate.
The husband thereafter died and the wife filed a claim against his estate
for her monthly support and upon objection of other heirs her claim was
disallowed.
1.
The parties clearly had a right to enter into an agreement for
the equitable disposition of their property one to the other.
2.
A provision for the support and maintenance of the wife dur.
ing her lifetime was a proper subject to be considered.
3.
The husband had a lawful right to obligate himself and his
estate to that end.
4.
The contract here executed by the husband was not an obligation of a personal nature, but one in furtherance of his legal and moral
duty enforceable against him in his lifetime and therefore enforceable
against his estate.
5.
The question of death of either of the parties was contemplated by the parties according to the agreement.
6.
The agreement shows that the husband unconditionally
waived the right to make any claim against the wife's estate, but the
waiver of the wife against the husband's estate was not unconditional,
but was conditionally made in that she was permitted to reserve to herself the right to claim the monthly support.-Judgment reversed with
instructions to allow the wife's claim.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EMPLOYMENT OF ATTORNEY-NECESSITY OF ACTION BY COUNCIL-PAROLE EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO CHANGE COUNCIL RECORD--Kinzie vs. Town of Haxtun-No. 14069-Decided January 25, 1937-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bakke.
Kinzie sought to recover attorney's fees on a special contract with
the town council of Haxtun. The court below dismissed the case.
1. Where an attorney claims compensation under a special contract with the municipality, such contract is void unless the city council

complies with Section 9171, C. L. 1921, which, among other things,
provides that every resolution or order to enter into a contract the vote
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must be properly recorded and concurrence of a majority of the council
members is required.
2. A contract for professional services comes within the above
requirement.
3. The provisions in regard to recording the'vote aremandatory.
4. Parole evidence is not admissible to alter or change the minutes
or record of the council.-Judgmentaffirmed.
PLEADING-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN TEN
DAYS-WAIVER-Martin vs. Bower-No. 14080-Decided February 1, 1937-,-pinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
1. Failure to file a motion for new trial within ten days after
judgment is fatal to right of review.
2. Where parties consented to two continuances after motion for
new trial was filed too late, such circumstances alone do not establish
waiver.
3.
One contending that objections to filing a motiorn for new
trial have been waived, has the burden of showing waiver.
4. Motion to-dismiss writ of error sustained.
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